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Abstract 
Sketching is considered by artists and designers to be a vital tool in the creative 
process.  However, research shows that externalisation during the creative process (i.e., 
sketching) is not necessary to create effectively.  This study examines whether sketching may 
play a more important role in the subjective experience of creativity by facilitating the deeply 
focused, optimal state of consciousness termed 'flow' (being 'in the zone').  The study 
additionally explored whether sketching affects flow by easing cognitive load or by providing 
a clearer sense of self-feedback.  Participants carried out the creative mental synthesis task 
(combining sets of simple shapes into creative drawings), experimentally simulating the 
visual creative process. Ideas were generated either mentally before committing to a final 
drawing, or with external perceptual support through sketching, and cognitive load was 
varied by using either three- or five-shape sets. The sketching condition resulted in greater 
experience of flow and lower perceived task difficulty.  However, cognitive load did not 
affect flow and there was no interaction between load and sketching conditions. These 
findings are the first to empirically demonstrate that sketching increases flow experience, and 
that this is not dependent on an associated reduction in overall working memory load.    
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1.  Introduction 
Sketching has long been considered essential to the creative process (Kleiner, 
2008/2014), and as such is taught extensively as a fundamental skill in art and design 
education programmes (Efland, 1990).  However, artists and designers may over-emphasise 
the value of sketching in enhancing creativity, with purported benefits of sketching to 
performance supported by only patchy and contradictory evidence (Anderson & Helstrup, 
1993; Bilda, Gero, & Purcell., 2006; Kokotovich & Purcell, 2001; Verstijnen, Hennessey, 
van Leeuwen, Hamel, & Goldschmidt, 1998a; Verstijnen, van Leeuwen, Goldschmidt, 
Hamel, & Hennessey, 1998b).  Nonetheless, creator attitudes reflect a belief that sketching 
must facilitate creativity and when sketching is thwarted the end result is often frustration 
(Bilda et al., 2006).  Despite this disconnect between creators’ attitudes and evidence 
suggesting that sketching does not greatly improve creativity, little has been done to 
investigate how sketching might influence the subjective experience of creating.  
In their protocol analysis study with architects, Bilda et al. (2006) found that 
sketching and blindfolded architects were able to produce equally creative and practical 
designs, despite claiming that sketching was vital to their process.  When interviewed, the 
architects perceived three main benefits of sketching: 1) it helps clarify, reinterpret, and 
verify ambiguous mental representations (synthesizing); 2) it eases tensions on memory 
resources (image maintenance); and, perhaps as a consequence of the previous two factors, 3) 
it increases confidence in creative abilities.  Bilda et al. conclude: “Sketching makes design 
thinking easier by ‘seeing it’ and ‘storing it’. In other words, sketching puts much less load 
on the cognitive processes needed to design” (p. 607).   
How the creative act feels to the creator is important.  Csíkszentmihályi (1975; 
1990/2002; 1996) proposed that the creative act is intrinsically driven by a desire to 
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experience a highly positive subjective immersion within the process that has been termed 
flow.  The concept of flow is similar to previous concepts of peak experience (Maslow, 1959; 
Privette & Bundrick, 1991) and is more commonly referred to as being ‘in the zone’.  It is 
believed to have positive consequences in terms of wellbeing and enhancement of 
performance, however causal directions of these relationships are unclear (Landhäußer & 
Keller, 2012), and the links are not always supported by empirical evidence (Cseh, Phillips, 
& Pearson, 2015).   
Sketching may facilitate certain prerequisite components of flow (Csíkszentmihályi, 
1990/2002).  Specifically, sketching may help provide less ambiguous self-feedback, 
facilitate a feeling of effortless attention and control by lightening burdens on cognitive load, 
and providing an increased sense of competence (skill-challenge balance).  The 
externalisation process during creativity (i.e., sketching) may therefore facilitate the creative 
process less in terms of performance advantages, and more through a direct effect on the 
motivating flow experience.   
Csíkszentmihályi (1975; 1990/2002) identified instant, unambiguous feedback as one 
of the vital factors in flow development.  Theoretically, this involves the continual, implicit 
awareness of successes and failures; confusion about progress is thought likely to disrupt 
flow.  However, the intricacies of what the term ‘feedback’ entails and how it is acquired 
cognitively have received little critical attention in the flow literature. Csíkszentmihályi 
(1996) noted that a defining factor of the feedback system used by creative individuals is the 
ability to filter good from bad ideas early on in the process.  The potential mechanisms that 
enable this filtering feedback system are the focus of the current study.  In particular, we 
examine the role that moving from internal mental imagery to external (perceptual) self-
feedback systems through sketching can play in the experience of flow, and how 
discrepancies between these feedback systems may also impact on flow.   
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1.1  Creative Performance with MI and Sketching 
Creative ideas often appear first as internal simulacra of perceptual phenomena (Arp, 
2005; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009), acting as an inner analogue of external forms (Dartnall, 
2007).  However, no matter how vivid, mental imagery (MI) is merely a simulation, and has 
been shown previously to have potential limitations.  Most famously, Chambers and Reisberg 
(1985) found that not a single participant was able to see the alternate pattern in Jastrow’s 
(1899) ambiguous duck-rabbit figure using MI only, but all of them could detect the alternate 
pattern once they externalised the image through drawing.  They suggested that MI lacks the 
same kind of information or is not associated with the same processes as perceptual imaging 
and therefore does not allow new interpretations to be formed from the same structural 
pattern.  Verstijnen et al. (1998a/b) showed that although MI was sufficient for creative 
combinations, sketching increased more complex restructuring abilities, resulting in more 
creative constructions in an experimental analogue of the creative process, the creative 
mental synthesis task (Finke & Slayton, 1988).  
Others have questioned the theory that MI is insufficient for full, reinterpretive 
creative cognition and argued that MI is sufficiently like perceptual imagery to allow for the 
complexities of creative thought (Shepard, 1978). Studies have since provided evidence that 
there is spatial and temporal equivalence between mental and perceptual imagery (Finke, 
1980), that restructuring and reconstrual does frequently occur, and that geometric data are 
preserved in MI to allow new categorical interpretations to be formed (Finke, Pinker, & 
Farah, 1989; Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, & Glisky, 1992).  Wiseman, 
Watt, Georgiou, and Gilhooly (2011) showed that creative ability was linked to the ability to 
reinterpret ambiguous mental images mentally, confirming that agility in internally 
manipulating imagery is a fundamental component of creativity.  Beethoven and Monet – 
deaf and blind, respectively, when they created some of their most famous masterpieces – and 
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Einstein – who carried out many thought experiments using only his imagination – exemplify 
in a real-world context that notable creativity does occur without access to or use of 
perceptual faculties (Garland-Thomson, 2005; Ghiselin, 1952; Harrison, 1988).   
Some design researchers suggest that while MI may be sufficient for most creative 
synthesis, perceptual feedback from sketching can enhance the ability to restructure and 
reinterpret (Verstijnen et al., 1998a/b).  However, others (Anderson & Helstrup, 1993; Bilda 
et al., 2006; Kokotovich & Purcell, 2001) found sketching did not enhance qualitative 
creative abilities.  Evidence that sketching is vital for complex creative restructuring to occur 
is therefore equivocal and is unlikely to be the only reason why artists and other creators are 
so reliant on sketching. 
 There is however an additional translational and dialectical function that occurs on the 
point of externalisation that is noted repeatedly by creators as a vital part of their process 
(Ghiselin, 1952; Koestler, 1964).  According to Wallas' (1926) classic creative process 
stages, ideas that form as mental insights must then be verified externally.  Therefore, even if 
creative revision and reinterpretation is equally possible with internal imagery alone, there is 
an added layer of objectivity and reassurance to be gleaned from perceptual re-evaluation 
after physical execution of an idea (Simonton, 2011).  Sketching may therefore provide a 
subjective feeling of clarity and certainty about the rightness of one’s actions, even when 
performance is not necessarily objectively enhanced.  This was also suggested by participants 
in Bilda et al.’s (2006) study when they spoke of sketching helping them synthesize and 
verify MI more clearly and reassure them they were on the right track.  Therefore the process 
of externalisation may provide the kind of unambiguous feedback and assurance about the 
feasibility of an early idea that is thought to facilitate the flow experience, whereas untested 
MI remains uncertain and ambiguous.  Therefore sketching may help clarify self-feedback 
and may function as a mechanism behind the filtering feedback system to which 
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Csíkszentmihályi (1996) referred, which encourages flow.  However, other benefits of 
sketching may be equally or more important, for instance the unburdening of cognitive 
resource load. 
1.2  The Impact of Sketching on Cognitive Load  
Anderson and Helstrup (1993, Experiment 2) found that sketching facilitated quantity 
of production, but not quality, concluding that the main advantage of sketching is to reduce 
the burden MI places on working memory resources (Kosslyn, 1980; Pearson & Logie, 
2004).  Externalising concepts so that they do not need to be continually juggled in working 
memory therefore may facilitate fluency by freeing up memory resources.  This 
computational offloading was also proposed by Scaife and Rogers (1996) as an important 
function of sketching, and by the qualitative accounts of the architects in the Bilda et al. 
(2006) study referring to the image maintenance purpose of externalisation.   
In analyses of cognitive activity over the course of the design process with expert 
architects, Bilda and Gero (2005; 2007) found that as time passed, cognitive activity (defined 
by number of coding categories represented during a think-aloud protocol, including 
references to physical, perceptual, functional, and conceptual actions) declined in a 
blindfolded, no-sketch condition significantly more than in the sketching condition.  This 
indicated that sketching helps conserve cognitive resources for more efficient and sustained 
creating (Anderson & Helstrup, 1993; Scaife & Rogers, 1996).  The proposed effect of 
externalisation on cognitive load suggests another way in which components of flow may be 
affected.  Because flow in theory depends on good skill-challenge balance and is 
characterised by feelings of effortless automaticity, it would generally be more likely to occur 
when the task is not too mentally taxing.  Since effort theoretically is a product of feelings of 
coping and skills adequate to deal with a certain level of demand, strained demands on 
working memory resources could therefore tip the skill-challenge balance in favour of 
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challenge and thereby hinder the likelihood of flow.  Sketching may act to reduce this strain 
on working memory processes (Pearson & Logie, 2004; 2015). 
1.3  Potential Confounding Effects of Externalisation: Discrepancy 
 However, some research also suggests performance with sketching can in some cases 
be inferior to MI alone, which may also translate to detrimental effects of sketching on the 
subjective experience of creating in certain circumstances.  Kokotovich and Purcell (2000) 
found that participants using only MI produced outputs that were judged more creative than 
those in the sketching condition.  Similarly, Verstijnen et al. (1998a) found that in one study 
an MI condition resulted in better figural synthesis than sketching.  Verstijnen et al. argued 
that there might be a distracting effect of sketching when the task is relatively easy. In 
contrast to this, Andrade (2009) found that the act of doodling, even when unrelated to a 
target task, helped to hone attention and enhance memory, suggesting that sketching should 
have a focusing rather than distracting effect during an easy task. 
 Research by Neblett, Finke, and Ginsburg (unpublished, as cited in Finke, 1990) 
found that the presence of another form of external perceptual support (physical shapes which 
could be moved but not combined or restructured) interfered with the ability to perform 
mental synthesis at all, because the externalised shapes did not fully reflect internal 
conceptions.  Similarly, in studies of motor action priming and imagery congruence (i.e., 
grasping an object after either action-congruent or incongruent imagining), action was found 
to be slowed by incongruent intention imagery (Ramsey, Cumming, Eastough, & Edwards, 
2010).  Therefore, perceptual feedback that clarifies and verifies internal conceptions might 
be helpful to faster, easier generation of ideas.  When ideas are re-evaluated perceptually, the 
limitations of MI may become apparent and cause disruption.  Discrepancies between internal 
predictions and external feedback (representational mismatch: Kavakli & Gero, 2001) may 
therefore also play a role in creative flow by introducing ambiguity and expectation violation 
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which must be resolved before continuing.  The role of perceptual feedback in flow might 
therefore depend on how well the implementation of an idea succeeds at the point of sensory 
verification, and the sense of congruence between idea simulations and their physical 
execution.   
1.4  Study Overview 
In this study, the aim was to bridge the gap between cognitive design research and the 
motivation, emotion, and flow research to explore whether and why sketching might have a 
measurable impact on flow experience during visual creativity.  Participants performed Finke 
and Slayton's (1988) creative mental synthesis task (CMST) as an analogue of the visual 
creative process, either with or without access to sketching, to explore the effects of visual 
feedback on creative flow.  To examine how this interacted with increasing cognitive load, 
participants also carried out either the traditional three-shape-set task (Finke & Slayton, 
1988) or an expanded version with five shapes (Barquero & Logie, 1999).  Secondary 
measures of affect change (another measure of subjective experience linked to flow and 
creating: Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2012; Cseh et al., 2015), performance, sense of task 
difficulty, idea-execution congruence, and MI vividness were also explored. 
Research aims and hypotheses 
Main effects 
Previous research (Anderson & Helstrup, 1993; Kokotovich & Purcell, 2000; Neblett 
et al., as cited in Finke, 1990; Verstijnen et al., 1998a/b) has shown mixed effects of 
perceptual sketching support on creative performance.  Bilda et al. (2006) suggest there is a 
disconnect between the effect of sketching on performance and creators’ reliance on and 
attitudes toward sketching.  The chief benefit of sketching for creators may therefore be how 
it affects the creators’ cognitive-emotional subjective experience of creating.  The main 
prediction of this study was therefore that sketching would facilitate flow. 
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Secondary mediating and outcome measures 
The anticipated main effect of feedback support type (MI vs. sketching) on flow was 
explored in relation to some other potential mediating factors and dependent measures, to aid 
in interpretation of findings.  In particular, main effects of cognitive load increase and 
interactions between cognitive load and sketching support on flow and other secondary 
outcome variables (i.e., affect change, self-rated and objective performance, perceived task 
difficulty, idea-execution congruence) were also explored.   
Exploratory correlations were also measured between flow and sense of difficulty, 
idea-execution congruence, self-rated creativity, and trait imagery vividness, to examine 
whether these factors might also mediate effects.  Partial correlations and a mediation 
analysis were conducted post-hoc to explore potential inter-relations between variables.  
Correlations were also measured between flow, affect change, and performance measures. 
2.  Method 
2.1  Participants and Design 
This was a 2 x 2 between-subjects study design with two independent variables: 1) 
feedback support type: CMST carried out either with MI only or with sketching (SK); 2) 
cognitive load: combining either three or five shapes at a time during the CMST.  Eighty-
eight university students, mostly first- and second-year psychology undergraduates, were 
randomly allocated to one of four conditions, referred to as 3-MI, 3-SK, 5-MI, or 5-SK.  Two 
additional students who were allocated to the 5-SK condition failed to follow task rules and 
produced entirely invalid drawings; they were therefore excluded from all analyses. Our 
sample size was determined in relation to previously published studies on sketching and 
visual creativity (e.g., Anderson & Helstrup, 1993; Vertijnen et al., 1998a;b; Pearson & 
Logie, 2015), with the sample size chosen to ensure that the number of participants tested in 
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each condition equalled or exceeded those specified by previous studies. Data collection 
ceased once the pre-specified sample size had been reached. Participants were recruited via 
the department’s participation pool for course credit and tested individually or occasionally in 
non-interactive groups of two to three (all in same condition) in the laboratory.  Conditions 
did not differ significantly in terms of gender or age (see Table 1 for all demographic 
information). 
 
Table 1. Demographic information by condition (3-MI, 3-SK, 5-MI, 5-SK) 
Total (N = 88) Feedback Support 
Shape Number MI (n = 45) SKETCH (n = 43) 
3 Shapes 
(n = 42) 
3-MI (n = 21) 
Age: M = 21.38, SD = 4.57 
Gender: 14 F, 7 M 
3-SK (n = 21) 
Age M = 21.10, SD = 2.53 
 Gender: 13 F, 8 M 
5 Shapes 
(n = 46) 
5-MI (n = 24) 
Age M = 21.25, SD = 5.92 
 Gender: 16 F, 8 M 
5-SK (n = 22) 
Age M = 21.09, SD = 5.16 
Gender:  13 F, 9 M 
 
2.2  Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed several pre- and post-task questionnaires and carried out a 
modified version of Finke & Slayton's (1988) CMST (Cseh et al., 2015). The CMST is a 
paper-and-pen task that involves participants mentally combining simple sets of 
alphanumeric and geometric shapes (e.g., triangle, letter J, number 8; see Finke & Slayton or 
Cseh et al. for full pool of 15 shapes) into a creative new picture of a recognisable object or 
scene by manipulating the shapes relative to one another according to rules: participants 
could change the size of the shapes, rotate, flip, overlap or embed the shapes, but could not 
skew the shape proportions, repeat shapes, or embellish. Participants in this study were given 
workbooks of 40 shape-sets, with space to produce a written description of the pattern and the 
drawn pattern beneath each set.  Although workbooks deviate from the original Finke and 
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Slayton procedure (where sets were presented verbally), workbooks were used here to give 
uninterrupted concentration time to allow flow to develop.  Participants were given 30 
minutes to work through the workbook freely, and were able to skip sets and return to 
skipped sets later.  No pressure was placed on them to finish the workbook (which they were 
told was deliberately too long, to ensure occupation for the full 30 minutes), and they were 
told to be creative and to try and enjoy the task, to encourage a relaxed atmosphere.   
Participants were given a presentation of the upcoming task, and then completed a 
pre-task Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), a 
very common mood adjective checklist scale, to gauge pre-task affect. The Vividness of 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973) was administered next, to assess trait 
vividness of MI (participants are asked to imagine scenarios and rate their subjective 
similarity to actual perception).  Participants then performed the CMST in one of four ways, 
as follows: 
2.2.1  Experimental factors and conditions. 
Feedback support type (MI vs. sketching). 
Workbooks were modified to accommodate the four conditions of this study.  In the 
MI conditions, participants performed all syntheses mentally and were instructed not to 
sketch until they had first written down a verbal description of their idea, then drew the image 
underneath only once, and could not change anything thereafter.  This committed them to an 
idea before they were able to evaluate or reinterpret it perceptually.  Participants were only 
given enough workbook space to draw one final image.  The sketching groups, on the other 
hand, were provided with extra workbook space and were encouraged to sketch freely and 
continually while generating ideas.  Once they had written a description, they too had to 
commit to one idea/drawing. 
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Cognitive load. 
Participants were given a workbook containing either 40 three-shape (regular load) or 
40 five-shape (increased load) sets.  Sets were semi-randomly generated (see Finke & 
Slayton, 1988, for selection process). See Figure 1 for examples of sets and possible 
responses from each condition.  
 
Figure 1.  Example sets for MI vs. SKETCH and 3-Shape vs. 5-Shape Cognitive Load 
conditions 
 
  
2.2.2  Idea-execution congruence and perceived difficulty.  
To measure the experience of incongruence between mental and perceptual feedback, 
following each set and before moving on to the next, all participants filled out a one-item 
idea-execution congruence scale (adapted from Jaarsveld & van Leeuwen, 2005), answering 
the question ‘How close do you feel your final drawing is to the way you first imagined it?’ 
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using a 1-4 Likert scale (not at all close – identical) to gauge the level of congruence between 
the idea generation and final execution stages of their creative process on each trial.  A mean 
was then calculated from all scores per participant. 
Afterwards, the booklets were collected and the final questionnaire pack administered.  
This included the nine-item Flow State Scale - Short General (FSS-2: Jackson, Eklund, & 
Martin, 2004/2010), a questionnaire designed to measure experience of each of the nine 
components of flow (Csíkszentmihályi, 1990/2002; Figure 2), during the immediately 
preceding CMST.  An example of a 
statement from the FSS-2 that 
participants rated on a 1 (strongly 
disagree) - 5 (strongly agree) Likert 
scale, in order to gauge the time 
distortion component of flow, is " The 
way time passed seemed to be different 
from normal." 
The PANAS scale was then 
repeated, to measure post-task affect and 
to calculate change compared to pre-task affect.  Lastly, a post-task questionnaire was given 
asking participants to rate their own overall creativity on the task and to rate how difficult 
they found the task (both on 1-5, not at all/slightly-extremely scale). Questionnaires were 
always presented in the same order.  
2.2.3  Objective performance ratings. 
Participants’ drawings were then extracted from the workbooks and rated on two 
objective creative performance measures by the first author (GC): productivity (the number of 
complete, valid drawings produced by each participant during the timeframe, as a measure of 
1. Clear goals 
2. Immediate, unambiguous feedback 
3. Skill-challenge balance 
4. Merging of action & awareness 
5. Total focus on task 
6. Sense of control 
7. Lack of self-consciousness, no worry of failure 
8. Time distortion 
9. Autotelic (intrinsically-motivated) experience 
 
Figure 2.  The nine traditional components 
of flow (Csíkszentmihályi, 1990/2002) 
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fluency) and transformational complexity (the number of changes the original shape set 
underwent to form the final construct; this is a count measure of the number of rotations, size 
changes, and overlaps/embeddings of the shapes in relation to one another and is a measure 
of mental agility; see Cseh et al., 2015, for full rating procedure and details).  The basic rules 
were the same when calculating the transformational complexity of images produced with 
either three or five shapes; however, maximum change counts were naturally increased when 
rating images from the five-shape conditions.  Although this is a largely objective measure, 
some subjectivity can occasionally occur; therefore a random selection of approximately 10% 
(n = 131) of the drawings was checked by a second research assistant (blind to conditions).  
Inter-rater reliability was found to be high (r (131) = .88, p < .001).  Although the first author 
who carried out these ratings was not blind to conditions, this is usually the case, or is not 
specified (cf. Anderson & Helstrup, 1993; Palmiero, Cardi, & Belardinelli, 2011), as it has 
always been considered an objective change count measure that is conducted systematically 
and according to rules (as outlined originally by Anderson and Helstrup; additional rules and 
clarification were also added to ensure a systematic approach and to apply the measure to the 
more complex five-shape condition: Cseh, 2014); subjectivity can occur, however, in 
judging, for example, relative size of shapes to one another due to variations in participants' 
drawing skill.  Indeed, the inter-rater agreement check used here is innovative, as no other 
study to the authors' knowledge using the transformational complexity measure has employed 
this check previously. The total sample of participants produced 1199 valid images (39/1238 
– 3% – were invalid and excluded from further analysis; M = 13.61 valid images produced by 
each participant, SD = 5.81, range: 5-40). 
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3.  Results 
3.1  Analysis  
A two-way independent-samples ANOVA with sketching support and cognitive load 
as factors was performed on each dependent variable of interest.  Additionally two-tailed 
Pearson’s bivariate correlation analyses were conducted between variables across the sample 
as a whole.  There were no significant differences between conditions on VVIQ scores (MI 
vs. sketching: t (83) = - 0.84, p = .40; 3 vs. 5 Shapes: t (83) = 0.04, p = .97), suggesting 
groups were matched in terms of average natural ability to conjure MI. 
3.2  Main and Interaction Effects  
3.2.1  Factor effects on flow and affect change. 
See Table 2 for all descriptive and ANOVA F-statistics, partial eta squared effect 
sizes, and significance levels.  First, the main effects of sketching support (MI vs. sketching) 
and cognitive load (3 vs. 5 shapes) on flow were explored, and the results of the ANOVAs 
showed that there was a highly significant main effect of sketching support condition on flow 
scores, with those in the sketching conditions experiencing higher mean flow than the MI-
only conditions.  However, there was no main effect of cognitive load on flow, and there was 
no interaction between the two factors on flow.   
There were neither main effects of the two factors, nor interaction effects on affect 
change (either positive (PA) or negative affect (NA) change).   
3.2.2  Factor effects on creative performance. 
To examine how self-rated and objective performance were affected by sketching and 
by cognitive load, main and interaction effects were also explored in relation to these 
variables. 
Self-rated creativity. 
There were neither main effects nor interaction effects of sketching support or 
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cognitive load on self-rated creativity. 
Productivity. 
There were significant main effects of both cognitive load and sketching support 
condition on productivity.  The MI conditions produced on average 2.38 (p = .03) more valid 
images than the sketching conditions.  Significantly fewer images (4.11 fewer on average) 
were produced overall with five than with three shapes (main effect of cognitive load).  
However there was no significant interaction between sketching support and cognitive load. 
Transformational complexity. 
There was a significant main effect of cognitive load on transformational complexity: 
drawings produced with five shapes compared to three were, unsurprisingly, more complex.  
However there was no main effect of sketching support on complexity of drawings, nor an 
interaction effect of sketching support and cognitive load. 
3.3.3  Factor effects on perceived difficulty, idea-execution congruence. 
There was a main effect of sketching support condition on post-task sense of task 
difficulty ratings, with the MI conditions rating the task as significantly more difficult than 
the sketching groups, but no other effects (of cognitive load or an interaction).   
There were neither significant main nor interaction effects of sketching support or 
cognitive load on idea-execution congruence.   
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Table 2.  Descriptive and ANOVA statistics (cognitive load vs. feedback support type conditions). Estimates of effect size shown by 2η  
  Descriptive Statistics 2 x 2 ANOVA Results 
 
3 Shapes 5 Shapes 
Main Effect:  
Cognitive Load  
(3 vs. 5) 
Main Effect:  
Sketching Support 
(MI vs.SKETCH) 
Interaction: 
Cognitive Load  x Feedback 
Support Type 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
n M SD n M SD F 2η
  
p F 2η
 
p F 2η
 
p 
Flow 
MI 21 2.79 0.40 24 2.94 0.55 
0.00 .00 .95 8.78 .10 <.01 1.38 .02 .24 
SK 21 3.30 0.64 22 3.16 0.65 
PA Change 
MI 21 -4.76 4.57 24 -5.54 6.04 
0.50 .01 .48 3.05 .04 .08 0.00 .00 .95 
SK 21 -2.57 4.69 22 -3.50 6.93 
NA Change 
MI 21 0.81 5.28 24 1.13 3.22 
0.09 .00 .76 1.86 .02 .18 0.01 .00 .94 
SK 21 -0.29 2.17 22 -0.09 4.53 
Idea-Execution 
Congruence 
MI 21 2.61 0.38 24 2.54 0.44 
1.24 .02 .27 0.12 .00 .73 0.06 .00 .80 
SK 21 2.66 0.39 22 2.55 0.34 
Perceived 
Task Difficulty 
MI 21 4.00 0.84 24 3.92 1.02 
0.40 .01 .53 5.48 .06 .02 1.04 .01 .31 
SK 21 3.29 1.19 22 3.64 0.90 
Self-Rated 
Creativity 
MI 21 2.14 0.65 24 2.21 1.18 
0.00 .00 .99 1.48 .02 .23 0.09 .00 .76 
SK 21 2.48 1.03 22 2.41 1.14 
Productivity 
MI 21 18.05 6.10 24 11.92 4.63 
13.36 .14 <.001 5.16 .06 .03 3.17 .04 .08 
SK 21 13.48 5.66 22 11.36 4.70 
Transform. 
Complexity 
MI 21 3.21 0.50 24 6.09 0.87 
247.64 .75 <.001 0.67 .01 .42 0.18 .00 .68 
SK 21 3.14 0.53 22 5.87 1.21 
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Note. Significant results in bold.  
 
 
Table 1.  Exploratory correlation analyses between flow, affect change, creative performance, and performance experience/imagery acuity 
variables (two-tailed) 
 
   
Affect 
(N = 88) Creative Performance (N = 88) 
Performance Experience &  
Imagery Acuity 
  Flow PA  Change 
NA  
Change 
Self-Rated 
Creativity Productivity 
Transform. 
Complexity 
VVIQ  
(N = 85) 
Idea-
Execution 
Congruence 
Sense of 
Task 
Difficulty 
 Flow - .41*** -.19    .61***   .09   .15   .24*   .27*    -.59*** 
Affect 
(N = 88) 
PA Change - - -.11 .25* -.04 -.04   .22* .04  -.27* 
NA Change - - - -.23* -.14 -.02 -.10   -.30**  .16 
Creative 
Performance 
(N = 88) 
Self-Rated 
Creativity - - - -   .12   .12      .29**    .35**      -.52*** 
Productivity - - - - - -.26*   .03  .12  -.15 
Transform. 
Complexity - - - - - -   .02   .01  -.04 
Performance 
Experience &  
Imagery 
Acuity 
VVIQ  
(N = 85) - - - - - - -   .20     -.28** 
Idea-Execution 
Congruence - - - - - - - -    -.34** 
Sense of Task - - - - - - - - - 
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Difficulty 
Note. Significant correlations in bold; * indicates significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01; *** significant at p < .001 
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3.3  Correlations and Mediation Analyses 
See Table 3 for all correlation coefficients and significance levels.  Flow was strongly, 
negatively related to sense of task difficulty.  Flow was also positively and significantly 
correlated with idea-execution congruence and trait MI vividness (VVIQ scores).  Flow was 
also strongly correlated with PA increase and self-rated creativity, but not related to either 
objective measure of performance, replicating the previous findings of Cseh et al. (2015).   
Positive affect (PA) change (increase) was also negatively correlated with perceived 
task difficulty, but the positive relationship between perceived task difficulty and negative 
affect (NA) change (increase) was not significant.  There was a significant correlation 
between idea-execution incongruence and NA increase, but no correlation between 
congruence and PA change.   
Idea-execution congruence was negatively correlated with sense of task difficulty and 
positively related to self-rated creativity, but not to trait MI vividness (though this approached 
significance: p = .07).  Sense of task difficulty was negatively related to vivid trait MI and to 
self-rated creativity.  Vivid MI was significantly correlated with self-rated creativity, but not 
to either of the objective performance measures. 
3.3.2  Mediation analysis and partial correlations. 
Because of the significant impact of sketching on both flow and participants’ 
perception of task difficulty, as well as the significant correlation between flow and perceived 
difficulty, a mediation analysis was conducted to determine if perceived difficulty (the rating 
of how difficult participants found the CMST, post-task) mediated the effect of sketching on 
flow.  The mediation analysis was conducted according to methods detailed by Preacher and 
Hayes (2004; 2008), using the ‘INDIRECT’ SPSS syntax macro provided by Hayes (2013), 
which performs a series of regression analyses between variables, see Figure 3.  In this case 
the relationship between the predictor and outcome (c = .35 **) is reduced to below 
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significance (c’ = .20) once the mediator 
is included in the regression model.  The 
significance of the mediation effect was 
determined via bootstrapping with 5000 
resamples.  Significant mediation effects 
(at p < .05) are indicated when lower 
and upper confidence intervals (CIs) of 
the bootstrap values do not include 
zero (which is the case here: Lower CI 
= 0.02, Upper CI = 0.33) and the 
indirect relationships (Paths a and b in 
Figure 3) are significant; see Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004; 2008).  Since both of 
these conditions were satisfied in this 
mediation analysis, it can be concluded 
that perceived task difficulty was a significant mediator in the relationship between sketching 
and flow.   
Since cognitive load did not influence either flow or perceived difficulty, partial 
correlations were carried out between flow and perceived difficulty, controlling for other 
variables. The aim was to determine which other factors might be influencing the link 
between flow and difficulty, both of which had been similarly affected by sketching.   
The first partial correlation between flow and perceived difficulty controlled for idea-
execution congruence.  However, the relationship remained highly significant (r (85) = -.55, 
p < .001), therefore idea-execution congruence does not appear to be a significant factor in 
the link between flow and perceived task difficulty. Secondly, a partial correlation was 
Figure 3.  Diagram of mediation analysis 
between sketching/MI support condition, 
flow, and perceived task difficulty (*p < .05, 
**p < .01, ***p < .001). An initial regression 
examines the relationship between the 
predictor and the potential mediator variable 
(path a). The second step confirms the 
direct relationship between the predictor 
variable and the dependent variable (path 
c). The last regression analysis 
simultaneously enters the mediator and 
predictor variables to explain variance in the 
dependent variable (paths b and c’).  Path 
coefficients are uncorrected, as 
recommended by Preacher and Hayes 
(2008). 
c’ = -.20 (ns) 
c = -.35 ** 
b = -.32*** 
Perceived Task Difficulty 
Flow 
a = -.49* 
X = Predictor Y = Outcome 
Sketching/MI 
Support 
M = Mediator 
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conducted between flow and perceived difficulty, controlling for self-rated creativity, but this 
relationship also remained significant (r (85) = -.40, p < .001).  Lastly, a partial correlation 
was conducted controlling for trait MI vividness (VVIQ scores), but this too remained 
significant (r (82) = -.58, p < .001).  Results therefore do not support the possibility that the 
link between flow and perceived difficulty is mediated by idea-execution congruence, self-
perceived creativity, or trait MI vividness. 
4.  Discussion 
This study explored whether a significant benefit of sketching in the creative process 
is its positive motivational effect on the subjective cognitive-emotional experience of 
creating, by facilitating flow.  Secondary aims were to investigate some potential reasons 
behind this effect by examining factors related to perceived advantages of sketching outlined 
by previous researchers (Anderson & Helstrup, 1993; Bilda & Gero, 2005; 2007; Bilda et al., 
2006; Scaife & Rogers, 1996; Verstijnen et al., 1998a/b), including lightening of 
cognitive/memory resource load, disambiguating mental feedback, and effects on feelings of 
competence and affect.  Results support the main hypothesis by showing a significant impact 
of sketching on increased flow via a lowered sense of task difficulty, though there was no 
significant advantage in terms of affect change or creative performance.  The significant 
facilitating influence of sketching on flow and feelings of ease, but not creative performance, 
could help to explain the disparity that has been noted between artists’ and designers’ 
dependence on sketching and its lack of a strong impact on performance (Bilda et al., 2006).  
Bilda et al. found that architects believed sketching helped them perform better, preserve 
working memory space, and more clearly synthesize and verify mental images.  However, 
these were only perceived advantages which were not reflected in, for example, more 
creatively synthesized or feasible ideas.  The results of the current study show a similar 
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pattern. 
In this study three factors similar to those highlighted by Bilda et al. (2006) and others 
(e.g., Kavakli and Gero, 2001; Neblett et al., in Finke, 1990) were explored in relation to how 
they might impact on flow: creative performance (self-perceived and objective measures), 
cognitive (working memory) load, and idea-execution congruence (disparity upon translation 
from internal to external perceptual feedback).  All three were believed to have potential links 
to sense of task difficulty and trait MI vividness, which were also explored as possible 
influential variables in flow formation within visual creativity. 
4.1  Self-Perceptions and Objective Creative Performance 
Flow was shown both in this study and in an earlier study (Cseh et al., 2015) to be 
highly correlated with self-ratings of creativity, confirming again that self-concept about skill 
is important in relation to flow.  Bilda et al. (2006) did not formally measure self-perceptions 
about performance in their study with architects.  However, architects were reported to 
invariably believe they would be unable to design effectively without access to sketching; 
however, measures of design creativity and practicality were equal with or without sketching.  
The results of the current study also show a lack of difference in objective performance 
between sketching support conditions.  
Since sketching increases flow, when someone sketches they would be more likely to 
enjoy the creative process and experience a good fit between their skills and the demands of 
the task.  Therefore it was considered likely that creators allowed to sketch could in turn be 
more likely to rate their creative ability higher than those not allowed to sketch, which could, 
again, influence flow in a cyclical, upward spiral.  However, since sketching did not appear to 
influence self-perceived creativity ratings in this study, this does not account for the effect of 
sketching on flow.   
Sketching did not improve objective performance, which is in line with the findings of 
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Bilda et al.’s (2006) study and their conclusion that sketching mainly helps provide feelings 
of ease rather than true facilitation of processes needed to perform more creatively.  If 
anything, in the current study the MI-only conditions fared slightly better overall, having 
significantly higher productivity and marginally (though non-significantly) higher 
transformational complexity ratings.   
The finding that sketching did not improve productivity at first glance may appear to 
contradict those of Anderson and Helstrup (1993, Experiment 2), who found that sketching 
increases the number of patterns that are produced in a timeframe.  However, the procedure 
followed by Anderson and Helstrup was quite different – they were comparing fluency of 
producing variations on a theme, within a limited timeframe imposed on each set.  In the 
current study, participants worked on a workbook of discrete sets, producing only one final 
image for each set, and with no time limits imposed on each set.  Task instructions told 
participants not to worry about completing the workbook and to have fun; this may have 
resulted in participants not being particularly focused on speed of production.  The sketching 
participants may therefore have spent more time exploring more options before settling on 
their final images and moving on, thereby limiting the number of sets they could complete in 
the timeframe.  Therefore in this study the higher number of sets completed by the MI 
conditions compared to the sketching conditions likely reflects that drawing out ideas, 
practically speaking, takes longer than simply imagining them, rather than signaling an effect 
on cognitive processing speed.    
4.2  Perceived Difficulty, Skill-Challenge Balance, and Cognitive Load 
Sketching significantly increased flow and decreased perceived task difficulty, and the 
mediation analysis suggests that decreasing perception of difficulty is an important function 
that sketching likely serves in the development of flow.  This supports Bilda et al.’s (2006) 
conclusion that sketching makes the design process seem easier, even when it resulted in 
MENTAL AND PERCEPTUAL FEEDBACK IN CREATIVE FLOW 26 
 
 
  
equal performance outcomes.  In their study, Bilda et al. referred to this easing of perceived 
difficulty being a result of generally lightened loads on the cognitive processes required in the 
creative process, including on memory resources.  However, in the current study the 
relationship between flow and perceived task difficulty was independent of objective 
cognitive load increase, and unmediated by other factors thought to potentially contribute to 
sense of effort, such as idea-execution congruence, trait vividness of MI, or self-ratings of 
creative ability.   
The only factor shown here to impact on perceived difficulty was sketching; the 
reasons behind that effect need to be further explored.  Interestingly, sketching facilitated 
flow but did not impact on affect change, which has been previously shown to have strong 
ties to flow in Cseh et al. (2015), and which was a repeated finding in this study.  Flow has 
both cognitive and emotional aspects to it, though the distinction and relationships between 
these categories of components can be unclear (de Manzano, Theorell, Harmat, & Ullén, 
2010).  This lack of an impact of sketching on affect, while still influencing flow, signals that 
sketching influences the specifically cognitive components of flow while leaving affective 
variables – as well as factors influencing both objective and self-perceptions about creative 
skill – unaffected.     
  Skill-challenge balance is considered the core of flow theory, with the concept of 
‘challenge’ inherently based on a sense of perceived 'difficulty’ or perceived task ‘demands’.  
Landhäußer and Keller (2012) noted that ‘challenge’ refers to a personal subjective 
comparison of how well one’s skills are able to cope with the demands of the task, and 
perceived difficulty also has this connotation.  Therefore perceived difficulty should not be 
confused with objective demands.  Efklides, Samara, and Petropoulou (1999) note that 
although objective task demands and perceived difficulty are often related, they are not 
perfectly mirrored, as perception depends on various factors, including individual differences 
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in ability, and affect. 
Bilda et al. (2006) suggested that one of the ways that sketching may support the 
creative process is by reducing strain on working memory resources and by supporting image 
maintenance.  Theoretically if a task becomes objectively more difficult, one would expect 
more errors to occur in its performance, and in past research, increases in cognitive load 
through manipulation of shape number in the CMST (e.g., Barquero & Logie, 1999) have 
shown that participants do produce more invalid images when they have to combine a higher 
number of shapes.  This was also reflected to an extent in the current study by the lower 
number of images produced overall with five compared to three shapes, suggesting a slowing 
down of processes with additional cognitive load.  However, flow and perceived difficulty 
were only significantly affected by what kind of cognitive feedback participants had access to 
during idea generation – perceptual or mental.  The finding that sketching does not help more 
as task complexity increases is one also found by Verstijnen et al. (1998b), where the 
beneficial effect of sketching was only found when particularly complex shapes (a three-
dimensional diamond) were excluded.  The current study has therefore identified one specific 
factor that can influence perception of difficulty, namely sketching, and found that this effect 
is independent of cognitive load in terms of working memory capacity strain, which may play 
less of a role in creative flow than previously assumed.   
4.3  Feedback Ambiguity, Congruence, and MI Vividness 
If not cognitive load, what other factors then might sketching be influencing in 
relation to sense of difficulty and flow?  Efklides, Papadaki, Papantoniou, and Kiosseoglou 
(1998) suggest that feelings of difficulty may depend on a great many inter-relating 
characteristics of the individual and the task, but that one particular factor may be people’s 
own conceptions of their previous experiences and abilities with similar problems and the 
ease with which they are able to draw on memory resources.  In a creativity task, these 
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factors may relate to MI acuity and discrepancies between expectations and outcomes of 
performance. 
In this study, how access to perceptual feedback through sketching may affect creative 
flow was also explored in relation to whether it might reduce a sense of feedback ambiguity 
while creating.  Since MI is a limited simulation, the feedback a creator may get using MI 
alone may not be very complete.  As Chambers and Reisberg (1985) and Verstijnen et al. 
(1998a/b) demonstrated, there are potential limitations to MI, particularly to resolving 
structural ambiguities.  Externalising and re-evaluating an idea with the aid of sketches may 
clarify and elaborate on MI, disambiguating feedback about the value and feasibility of an 
idea.  If so, sketching during idea generation might result in a closer match between an idea 
and its final execution.  Being unable to perceptually test ideas (MI conditions) could 
engender a sense of increased discord between an initial image and the reality on paper.  At 
this point, ideas can be perceptually reinterpreted and potentially found to have been 
misleading (idea-execution incongruence), a factor  shown to sometimes have a confounding 
influence on cognitive processes (Neblett et al., in Finke, 1990; Ramsey et al., 2010).  
However, sketching does not seem to have significantly helped to resolve discrepancy 
between an initial concept and the execution of it, as there was no effect of sketching on idea-
execution congruence. However, idea-execution congruence was found to be significantly 
related both to perceived task difficulty and to flow, but did not mediate the link between 
flow and perceived difficulty.  Therefore, it does not appear that resolving a sense of 
discrepancy is mainly responsible for why sketching reduces perceived difficulty or how 
difficulty is related to flow.      
Although idea-execution congruence was significantly correlated with flow, it was 
not, however, linked to positive affective change.  The exception was NA increase, which 
was significantly related to incongruence.  The fact that some variables, such as productivity 
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(linked to PA change but not flow in our previous study reported in Cseh et al., 2015), and 
idea-execution congruence here, relate differently to flow and PA change once again signals a 
distinction between cognitive and emotional aspects of flow and between flow and PA.  
Therefore a more clear distinction between which parts of the flow experience are emotion-
based, and which are cognitive, is required.   
The findings in the current study partly support the findings of Wiseman et al. (2011), 
who found that MI acuity was linked to both self-perceived trait creativity and objective 
measures of creative flexibility and fluency.  In the current study vivid MI did not relate to 
objective measures of performance, including transformational complexity, which is 
theoretically a measure of structural reconfiguration and agility.  However, general vividness 
of imagery in the current study was related to several measures of subjective experience of 
performance, including self-belief in creative ability, perception of task difficulty, and 
(marginally) to idea-execution congruence.  Vividness of MI, which is measured in terms of 
mainly static imagery, may be different to MI agility or control, however, as measured by 
figure reversal ability in Wiseman et al., which may be responsible for the difference in 
findings about objective performance.  Subjective clarity of MI does, however, seem to be 
significantly linked to how subjectively pleased creators were by their own perceived creative 
performance, feelings of difficulty during the task, and flow.   
The links found between idea-execution, vivid MI, perceived difficulty, and flow, and 
the lack of effects from cognitive load may suggest that clarity of mental feedback plays a 
greater role in how the creative process is experienced than cognitive load does, in terms of 
juggling increasing demands on working memory.  Although the current study found links 
from trait MI vividness and idea-execution congruence to both flow and perceived task 
difficulty, sketching only had a direct impact on flow via perceptions of difficulty and did not 
influence congruence between ideas and physical executions.  Trait MI vividness, idea-
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execution congruence, and self-rated creativity also could not explain the link between flow 
and perceived difficulty.  So although MI vividness and internal-external or expectation-
outcome congruence are some part of flow and perceived difficulty, they are not the specific 
aspects of these variables that sketching affects.   
It is important to note further replication will be necessary in order to test the overall 
robustness of our effects, and the objectivity of performance measures such as 
transformational complexity will benefit by greater validation through blind rating. There 
may also of course be other factors contributing to the effect of sketching on flow and 
perception of difficulty, such as the benefits of physical embodiment in drawing and art-
making (Banfield & Burgess, 2013) or its influence on attentional focus (Andrade, 2009).   
Indeed effects of sketching on flow could be further explored in relation to several of the 
other flow components such as sense of control and merged action and awareness (Figure 2; 
Csíkszentmihályi, 1990/2002), which suggests a new avenue for future flow and creativity 
researchers to explore.   
5.  Conclusion 
This study has demonstrated for the first time that it is possible to measurably 
improve the experience of flow by experimentally improving access to perceptual feedback 
via sketching during visual creativity.  Results of this study suggest that sketching affects 
flow by reducing sense of effort, but that this relationship between flow and perceived 
difficulty is not a function of objective demands on working memory resources (cognitive 
load), nor is it linked to idea-execution congruence, self-perceived creativity, or trait MI 
vividness.  Although these specific variables were ruled out in the effect of sketching on 
flow, clarity of mental feedback and self-concept do appear to be more closely related to the 
subjective experience of creative flow than cognitive load.   
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This study showed that sketching during the creative process facilitates flow by 
decreasing perceived effort; therefore sketching can be seen as a motivating influence on the 
creative process which could encourage perseverance and more frequent practice and 
therefore faster attainment of goals and mastery. Further research is needed to better 
understand the specific conditions of the creative process that influence perception of 
difficulty and how sketching may arbitrate that link to encourage flow. 
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